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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GREENBURGH UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1586, I.A.F.F., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15830 
FAIRVIEW FIRE DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
THOMAS F. DE SOYE, ESQ., for Charging Party 
KORNFELD, REW, NEWMAN & ELLSWORTH (FRANK T. SIMEONE and 
SHARON WORTHY of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the 
Greenburgh Uniformed Firefighters Association, Local 1586, 
I.A.F.F. (Association) to a decision by an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALT). After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed the 
Association's charge against the Fairview Fire District 
(District) which alleges that the District violated §2 09-a.l(d) 
of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
transferred certain fire dispatching duties from the 
Association's unit of fire fighters to the employees of a 
different emr)iover.-/ 
-''The dispatching in issue is now done through the Westchester 
County Fire Control. 
Board - U-15830 -2 
Relying upon our decision in State of New York (DOCS)-7 
(hereafter State DOCS), our three "civilianization" cases,-7 and 
Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority-7 (hereafter Niagara 
Frontier), the ALJ concluded that the District's substitution of 
civilian personnel for fire fighters to do certain fire 
dispatching necessitated a balancing of the parties^ interests 
under Niagara Frontier. Balancing those interests, the ALJ 
concluded that the impact of the transfer on the.Association's 
unit and its unit employees was de minimis and that the 
District's interests were predominant. Therefore, the ALJ held 
that the District was not under any duty to negotiate the 
transfer decision with the Association. 
The Association argues in its exceptions that the ALJ 
misapplied the precedents earlier referenced. It argues that the 
ALJ should not have used a balancing test because the District 
did not allege and prove that there was a significant change in 
the job qualifications for dispatch duties. According to the 
Association, the ALJ erred in finding that the civilianization of 
the dispatch function constituted a per se change in 
qualifications for that job. Similarly, the Association argues 
that the District was required to prove a change in its dispatch 
>'27 PERB 53055 (1994), aff'd. A.D.2d , 29 PERB 57008 (3d 
Dep't 1996). 
^
7Citv of New Rochelle, 13 PERB 53045 (1980) ; City of Albany, 
13 PERB ?[3011 (1980); County of Suffolk, 12 PERB 53123 (1979). 
^18 PERB 53083 (1985). 
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services and that the ALJ again erred in concluding that any 
change in qualifications effected, per se, a change in those 
services. Finally, the Association argues that if the ALJ 
correctly resorted to a balancing test, she incorrectly balanced 
the parties' interests because the Association's interests are 
not de minimis and because the District transferred the work only 
to save money, not to effectuate any change in its level or 
manner of services. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the AKT's decision. 
The Association's arguments that existing precedent was 
misapplied by the ALJ persuades us of the need to explain our 
reasoning in cases involving the civilianization of uniformed 
services in more detail. 
The civilianization cases cited involved the transfer to 
civilian personnel of several tasks which had been performed 
exclusively by police officers. The holding in each case was 
that the civilianization of the work which had been done by the 
police officers involved what was described variously as the 
employer's "fundamental management right to determine the 
necessary employment qualifications of personnel performing the 
tasks at issue",-7 "a determination of the qualifications for 
the respective "iobs involved"--7 or the "ricrht of the remninver] 
^City of New Rochelle, supra n. 3, at 3073 
^City of Albany, supra n. 3, at 3015. 
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to alter the qualifications of the personnel performing the tasks 
in question . . . . Il-/ 
Similarly, in West Hempstead Union Free School District-'' 
(hereafter West Hempstead) and Town of Brookhaven-7 .• the two 
other cases discussed in Niagara Frontier, there was no inquiry 
or determination as to whether the employees to whom the work was 
transferred, either as a group or individually, were more or less 
qualified in fact to do the work transferred than the employees 
they replaced or whether the work performed after the transfer 
was done better, worse or the same as before the transfer. 
Despite there being no substantial change in fact in the actual 
duties performed, the transfers in both West Hempstead and Town 
of Brookhaven were held to be predominantly related to the 
employer's decision to alter the level of service it provided to 
its constituency and, therefore, nonmandatory. — ' 
Niagara Frontier attempted to distill all of the prior 
transfer of unit work cases and produced the now familiar basic 
framework for analysis of such cases. Against the backdrop of 
the earlier civilianization cases, West Hempstead and Town of 
Brookhaven, the Board in Niagara Frontier stated the following: 
^County of Suffolk, supra n. 3, at 3221. 
§/14 PERB ^3096 (1981) . 
2/17 PERB |J[3087 (1984) . 
—
7In West Hempstead, the charging party's unit employees lost 
their jobs as a result of the transfer. In Town of Brookhaven, 
the unit employees were reassigned to other duties without loss 
of pay or benefits. 
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With respect to the unilateral transfer of unit work, 
the initial essential questions are whether the work 
had been performed by unit employees exclusively and 
whether the reassigned tasks are substantially similar 
to those previously performed by unit employees. If 
both of these questions are answered in the 
affirmative, there has been a violation of §209-a.l(d), 
unless the qualifications for the job have been changed 
significantly. Absent such a change, the loss of unit 
work to the group is sufficient detriment for the 
finding of a violation. If, however, there has been a 
significant change in job qualifications, then a 
balancing test is invoked; the interests of the public 
employer and the unit employees, both individually and 
collectively, are weighed against each other, (footnote 
omitted)^ 
In State DOCS, we again sought to comprehensively consider 
and analyze earlier transfer of work cases. In doing so, we 
specifically stated in State DOCS that the employer's 
civilianization of uniformed services represented "a de facto" 
change in qualifications. 
That case did not represent any change in our existing case 
law regarding the transfer of unit work. Our intention in State 
DOCS was merely to restate, in a more readily understandable way, 
what had already been said in the civilianization cases, West 
Hempstead, Town of Brookhaven and Niagara Frontier. 
The Association nonetheless seizes upon our reference in 
State DOCS to a "de facto" change in qualifications as the 
primary basis for its argument that a change in qualifications 
and services must be affirmatively pleaded and proved by an 
employer as the reason for a civilianization of uniformed 
^18 PERB f3083, at 3182 (1985) 
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services before there can be any balancing of interests under 
Niagara Frontier. 
Our use of the term "de facto" in State DOCS was not meant 
to suggest that a change in qualifications must be proven 
factually in a case involving civilianization of uniformed police 
or fire services. Such an interpretation is entirely 
inconsistent with the police civilianization cases, with Niagara 
Frontier, the cases discussed therein, and with State DOCS which 
reaffirmed those cases. Our use in State DOCS of the term "de 
facto" was intended as nothing more than a recognition of the 
fact that civilians lack the "special employment 
qualifications"—7 required of and possessed by police officers 
or fire fighters. We very recently had reason to reaffirm that 
these uniformed personnel are "fundamentally different from 
everyone else."—7 The substitution of civilians for police 
officers or fire fighters to deliver services previously 
performed by those uniformed personnel necessarily reflects an 
employer's determination that the specialized training and skills 
of the uniformed officer are not necessary to the performance of 
a given set of tasks, e.g., dispatch. It is the employer's 
determination to substitute positions having fundamentally 
different qualifications which has always been held to embrace 
—''County of Suffolk, supra n. 3, at 3221. 
^County of Erie and Sheriff of Erie County, 2 9 PERB 53 031, 
quoting with approval from City of Amsterdam, 10 PERB 53 031 
(1977). 
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the managerial right to establish qualifications even when 
specific tasks are unchanged. Therefore, it is not material that 
one or more civilians may be as capable objectively of performing 
certain tasks as one or more of the uniformed officers they 
replaced. 
The change in qualifications occasioned by the substitution 
of a civilian for a uniformed officer is sufficient to trigger 
the balancing of employer and employee interests under Niagara 
Frontier. The District was not required to also prove a change 
in level of service as a condition to invocation of Niagara 
Frontier's balancing test. As we stressed in State DOCSf the 
conclusion that qualifications are changed by a decision to 
civilianize uniformed services is only sufficient to trigger the 
balancing test in Niagara Frontier. But a balance of competing 
interests must still be made. In making that balance, it may be 
necessary, and it is certainly appropriate under our existing 
case law, to undertake an examination of the facts to ensure that 
the parties' interests which are to be balanced are correctly 
identified and properly weighed. The title-by-title examination 
conducted in State DOCS, for example, was not, as the Association 
argues, for the purpose of deciding whether to balance under 
Niagara Frontierf but how that balance should be struck. As 
State DOCS demonstrates,- although a change in qualifications is 
present in a civilianization case to a degree sufficient to 
trigger a balancing, the changes in level of service or other 
matters affecting managerial prerogatives effected by the 
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civilianization may, in fact, not be significant, and they may 
not be sufficient on balance to outweigh the employees' interests 
in a given case. The balance of interests on the facts of the 
case may reveal, for example, as it did in State DOCS, that there 
is not and was never intended to be any substantial change in the 
services actually delivered. If that be so, then that fact is as 
much properly considered in a balance of interests as any other 
relevant to that balance. The extent of the change in 
qualifications and services and the detriment to the unit and its 
employees will weigh heavily in making the necessary balance. 
The less the change in the former and the greater in the latter, 
the more likely the balance will favor negotiability of the 
decision to transfer the work. Conversely, the balance will tend 
to favor a determination that the civilianization is not 
mandatorily negotiable when the change in qualifications and 
services is substantial and the detriment to the unit employees 
is minimal. 
This brings us to the Association's argument that the ALJ 
inappropriately balanced the parties7 interests and that she 
should have found the employees' interests to be predominant. We 
do not agree, and find that the ALJ made the correct balance. 
Although the Association argues to the contrary, the 
transfer of work from the Association's unit is not itself 
sufficient to shift the balance of interests in favor of the 
Association. As work is always removed from a negotiating unit 
in every transfer case, regardless of the means by which the 
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transfer is effected, every transfer of work would have to 
constitute a refusal to negotiate if the Association were correct 
in its assertion. The dismissal of several improper practice 
charges after a balancing of all parties' interests establishes 
conclusively that there is not a refusal to negotiate simply 
because work has been transferred from a unit for performance by 
others outside of that unit. The simple loss of unit work is 
sufficient to support a violation when the balancing test under 
Niagara Frontier is not triggered, i.e., when there is not a 
significant change in qualifications. But if the balancing test 
under that decision is triggered by a significant change in 
qualifications, the loss of unit work is but one of the many 
factors which can be taken into account in making the balance. 
In this case, the loss of the unit work is the only 
detriment to the Association and its unit employees. As the ALJ 
found, unit employees did not suffer any loss of employment or 
benefits. What has been transferred is only the work of 
determining which apparatus to send to a fire on receipt of an 
alarm and the dispatching of that apparatus. The Association has 
retained all of its current members and all of the dispatching 
duties which are not related to fire alarms, which account for 
about ninety percent of the job. The civilianization decisions 
previously referenced hold clearly that a transfer of work in 
such circumstances, even if motivated solely by economic 
considerations, does not constitute a violation of an employer's 
duty to negotiate. 
Board - U-15830 -10 
For the reasons set forth above, the Association's 
exceptions are denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 31, 199 6 
Albany, New York 
#yj.l,t.blfl 
Pauline RT Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric J/ Schmertz, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, WESTCHESTER 
LOCAL 8 60, EASTCHESTER UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15775 
EASTCHESTER UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MIGUEL ORTIZ of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
RAINS & POGREBIN, P.C. (CRAIG R. BENSON Of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT) filed by the Eastchester Union 
Free School District (District) on a charge filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Westchester Local 860, Eastchester Union Free School District 
Unit (CSEA). CSEA alleges that the District violated §209-a.l(d) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
rescinded a past practice pursuant to which unit employees were 
allowed days off with pay on request for religious observance. 
On a stipulated record, the ALJ held the District in 
violation as alleged, rejecting the District's only defense, that 
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the practice was unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The District excepts only to the ALJ's decision that its 
practice as stipulated is constitutional and, therefore, 
mandatorily negotiable. CSEA argues in response that the ALJ's 
decision should be affirmed. 
After consideration of the parties' arguments, including 
those at oral argument, we reverse the ALJ and dismiss the charge 
upon the ground that the practice the District rescinded is 
unconstitutional and, therefore, not a mandatory subject of 
negotiations. 
We begin our discussion by stating that we are extremely 
reluctant to decide the constitutional question raised in defense 
to this charge. Constitutional analysis is beyond our claimed 
and recognized expertise and our decision on the 
constitutionality of the District's practice is not entitled to 
any judicial deference. Our reluctance is all the greater 
because Establishment•Clause cases have occasioned perhaps more 
split and arguably irreconcilable decisions than any other 
jurisprudential question. The many cases cited and discussed in 
the parties' briefs and the ALJ's decision amply demonstrate that 
point. We realize, however, that we are obligated to reach 
constitutional questions to the extent necessary to decide 
improper practice charges within our jurisdiction just as we are 
often required to construe various federal and state statutes in 
making decisions on negotiability questions and other issues 
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arising under the Act. In this case, the constitutional question 
raised by the District is entirely dispositive of the 
negotiability determination, which in turn is entirely 
dispositive of the charge. The practice the District admittedly 
rescinded unilaterally is granting paid release time from work, 
unquestionably and admittedly a mandatory subject of negotiation 
but for the constitutional question presented. If the practice 
is constitutional, then the District violated the Act as alleged; 
if the practice is unconstitutional, then it does not embrace a 
mandatorily negotiable term and condition of employment and the 
District's unilateral rescission of that practice did not and 
could not violate its duty to negotiate. Although'we believe 
that the parties would have been better advised to pursue the 
constitutional issue in a judicial forum, this charge is properly 
before us and our exclusive nondelegable jurisdiction^ over 
improper practice charges compels us to decide it. 
We rest our determination that the District's religious 
release time practice is unconstitutional upon the June 11, 1996 
decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Griffin v. 
Coughlin-7' (hereafter Griffin) , which contains a lengthy 
analysis of Establishment Clause doctrine before and after the 
United States Supreme Court's controlling decision in Lemon v. 
^Act §2 05.5(d). 
g/
 N.Y.2d (1996). 
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Kurtzian.-/ In Griffin, the Court held, in a 5-2 decision, that 
the State's grant of family visitation privileges conditioned 
upon an atheist or agnostic inmate's participation in a drug 
rehabilitation program, which adopted in major part what the 
majority concluded were the religious-oriented practices and 
precepts of Alcoholics Anonymous, violated the Establishment 
Clause. 
The District permitted employees who practice a religion 
paid time off from work upon demand to practice that religion. 
These paid days off from work were in addition to the several 
days off from work which all employees then and still receive. 
The District's practice had the result of denying its agnostics, 
atheists and religious nonpractitioners the benefit of additional 
days off with pay and without charge to leave credits, while 
granting only its religious practitioners such benefits. 
Although there is in the District's practice an element of 
accommodation of religious beliefs missing in Griffin, that is 
true only for those in its employ who currently adhere 
voluntarily to some religion and continue to do so. Those 
-
7403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, the Supreme Court synthesized 
its Establishment Clause cases into a three-pronged test 
centering around the concept of government neutrality. For 
governmental action to escape constitutional invalidation under 
the Establishment Clause, it must: (1) have a secular purpose 
which neither endorses nor disapproves of religion; (2) have an 
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) avoid 
creating a relationship between religion and government which 
entangles either in the internal affairs of the other. A 
violation of any one Lemon prong renders the governmental action 
unconstitutional. 
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District employees who do not now hold any religious beliefs or 
who do not actively practice their religion or those who in the 
future abandon those beliefs and practices are no differently 
situated in relevant respect than was the inmate in Griffin. 
The coercion in Griffin which was central to the majority's 
opinion was found in the government's conditioning of a benefit 
upon the inmate's participation in what the majority concluded 
was a religious activity. The District's practice similarly 
conditions a substantial monetary benefit upon an employee having 
or acquiring and maintaining some religious belief and practice. 
Paid time off from work upon demand can only be seen as a highly 
desirable employment related'benefit, surely no less desirable to 
an employee than the visitation privileges denied the inmate in 
Griffin. We see no relevant distinction between Griffin and this 
case. 
As the majority in Griffin was careful to articulate, the 
Establishment Clause is violated by any governmental action, 
whether subtle or overt, which coerces, pressures or influences a 
person's choices regarding religious belief or practice. Even if 
not coercive, the District's practice at the very least 
influences an employee's choice as to whether to adopt and 
maintain a set of unquestionably religious beliefs and practices 
by conditioning a substantial economic benefit solely on 
religious exercise. The District's practice did not simply 
remove an impediment to the free exercise of religion. That goal 
could have been accomplished by various alternatives necessary to 
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reasonably accommodate the exercise of religious beliefs as 
required by Title VII of the 1964 U.S. Civil Rights Act as 
amended. Without addressing the constitutionality of any of the 
various possible alternatives, such as unpaid leave or leave with 
charge to accruals, we conclude only that paid leave from work 
upon request conditioned exclusively upon participation in 
religious activity is unconstitutional under Griffin. The 
District's practice, therefore, is not mandatorily negotiable and 
the rescission of that practice did not violate the Act. 
For the reasons set forth above, the District's exceptions 
are granted and the ALJ's decision is reversed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 31, 1996 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella",""Chairperson 
Eric Jx Schmertz, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MIDDLE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION OF THE 
SCHENECTADY CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. -CP-3-4-9 
CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF 
SCHENECTADY, 
Employer. 
DECATALDO and DECATALDO (ROBERT T. DECATALDO of counsel), 
for Petitioner 
MCCARY & HUFF, LLP (KATHYRN MCCARY of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions and cross-exceptions 
filed, respectively, by the Middle Management Association of the 
Schenectady City School District (MMA) and the City School 
District of the City of Schenectady (District) to a decision by 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) as adopted and confirmed by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director).-' MMA filed a petition seeking to place the 
following positions into its existing unit: Development Officer; 
Architect; Personnel Assistant; and Clerk of the Works (Clerk). 
-
;The decision was issued by both the ALJ and the Director 
in response to a decision by Supreme Court in Union-Endicott 
Cent. Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 29 PERB ?[7004 (Sup. Ct. Alb. Co. 
March 199 6)(appeal pending). In relevant part, the Court held 
that a decision in a representation case must be made by the 
person who conducted the hearing, in this case the ALJ. 
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The petition was dismissed as to all but the Clerk, which was 
placed into MMA's unit. 
MMA excepts only to the dismissal of the petition as to the 
Development Officer. Specifically, MMA argues that the 
Development Officer is not a confidential employee as held. The 
District cross-excepts only to the placement of the Clerk into 
MMA's unit. The District argues that the Clerk does not share a 
community of interest with employees in MMA's unit. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ/Director decision. 
MMA argues in part that the ALJ/Director erred in excluding 
the Development Officer from its unit because there is another 
similar title currently included in a different unit in the 
District. The inclusion in a different unit of an arguably 
confidential title with duties arguably similar to those of the 
Development Officer is not dispositive of this unit placement 
petition because that position, and the appropriateness of its 
unit placement, are not before us. The appropriateness of a 
placement of the Development Officer into MMA's unit must be 
decided on its own merits. If the Development Officer is 
confidential, as the ALJ/Director found, its placement into MMA's 
unit is inappropriate as a matter of law because the incumbent of 
such title is ineligible for representation without regard to the 
placement of other titles. 
The basis for the ALJ's/Director's finding that the 
Development Officer is confidential is that the incumbent is 
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occasionally given information regarding staffing plans, staffing 
reductions or other work force changes before that information is 
shared with employees, their union representatives, or the public 
generally. 
The Development Officer's basic job is to obtain grant money 
to support District programs and staff. The Development Officer 
is given the information which the AKT/Director determined made 
the Development Officer position confidential because grant 
applications can impact the District's staffing decisions and 
vice versa. 
Confidential employees are defined in the Act as those "who 
assist and act in a confidential capacity" to managerial 
/ employees who have responsibility for the employer's labor 
negotiations, contract or personnel administration. We have 
previously held that persons whose duties make them privy to 
contemplated reductions in staffing or other personnel changes 
are confidential employees.-7 According to the unrebutted 
testimony, the Development Officer is exposed to personnel 
information as part of the grant application process, which often 
calls for•commitments of personnel for various periods of time. 
Knowledge of short-term and long-term personnel deployment plans 
is, accordingly, part of the information needed to perform the 
Development Officer's job. 
-''Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 
18 PERB [^3025 (1985) (staff reductions) ; City of White Plains, 
14 PERB H3052, aff'g 14 PERB ^4024 (1981) (promotions, transfers, 
•-.J layoffs and other personnel movements) . 
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If the information given to the Development Officer was 
merely of personnel decisions already made and which were certain 
to go into effect, then the Development Officer's simple receipt 
of that information before others who might be interested in it 
might not warrant exclusion from MMA's unit. The nature of that 
information in that circumstance, with or without identifying 
particulars, is not necessarily confidential in any relevant 
respect. The record fairly discloses, however, that the 
Development Officer has information shared with her by the 
District's Superintendent about contemplated or potential 
staffing and personnel decisions and changes. It is the 
Development Officer's exposure to information pertaining to these 
nonfinal staffing issues which warrants the ALJ's/Director's 
confidential determination and the Development Officer's 
continuing exclusion from MMA's unit. 
In placing the Clerk into MMA's unit, the ALJ/Director 
relied upon a similarity in salary, the Clerk's independence in 
working during the day, and a job content similar in certain 
respects to others in MMA's unit. The inability of the Clerk to 
bind the District to obligations in the course of his employment 
and the absence of supervisory authority over others were held 
not controlling because others in MMA's unit do not have these 
powers or responsibilities. 
The MMA unit includes employees who oversee and manage 
support operations for major District programs such as 
transportation, data processing, buildings and grounds, 
Board - CP-349 -5 
accounting, electronics and audio/visual, and purchasing. All, 
however, have primary responsibility for a major program area. 
Similar to other MMA unit positions, the Clerk, reporting to the 
Architect, a title which the ALJ/Director excluded from MMA's 
unit, oversees.the District's capital construction projects. 
The titles included in MMA's units are as varied as their 
employment conditions. Although the Clerk's position is 
dissimilar in certain ways to others in MMA's unit, this is not 
unexpected given the variety of job titles which are in MMA's 
unit. These dissimilarities, most markedly in respect to the 
degree of authority exercised over others, are unlikely, however, 
to produce any conflicts in contract negotiation or 
administration for they are unlikely to be subjects for 
negotiation. Although the Clerk's salary is admittedly at the 
low end of the broad salary range for this unit, it is 
approximately the same as that of another unit employee and not 
substantially different from at least one other unit employee. 
Moreover, the Clerk and one other unit employee report directly 
to the Architect, with whom they regularly consult regarding 
their job duties. At least one other unit employee has no 
supervisory responsibility over other District employees. 
In summary, as the ALJ/Director found, there is demonstrated 
a community of interest between the Clerk and others in MMA's 
unit arising out of similar program responsibilities, shared 
supervision by management personnel, a not dissimilar salary 
relationship, and common methods and conditions of job 
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performance. These provide a basis sufficient to place the Clerk 
into MMA's unit. 
For the reasons set forth above, the AKJ/Director decision 
and order is affirmed and the exceptions and cross-exceptions are 
denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Clerk of the Works is 
hereby placed into MMA's unit and that the petition must be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed in all other respects. 
DATED: July 31, 1996 
Albany, New York 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 10 00, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, ERIE COUNTY 
LOCAL 815, ERIE COUNTY WHITE COLLAR 
EMPLOYEES, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16452 
COUNTY OF ERIE, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (TIMOTHY CONNICK of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
MICHAEL A. CONNORS, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Erie County Local 815, Erie County White Collar Employees (CSEA) 
to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALT). CSEA's 
charge alleges that the County of Erie (County) violated 
§209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it subcontracted for the provision of medical services 
for residents of the Erie County Home and Infirmary (Home) with 
University Medical Services (UMS), a professional corporation 
offering medical services through the Erie County Medical Center 
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(ECMC).-1 After a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALT) 
dismissed the charge upon an application of the test articulated 
in Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority-7 (hereafter 
Niagara Frontier). The ALJ determined that although the work in 
issue had been exclusively bargaining unit work and the tasks 
performed (i.e., provision of medical services at the Home) were 
substantially similar, the County had changed the qualifications 
of the treating medical personnel and had thereby and otherwise 
substantially changed the health care delivered to the Home's 
residents. The ALJ concluded that the County's interests in 
determining the type and level of health care for the Home's 
residents outweighed those of the Association, despite the loss 
of seven unit positions and the layoff of five unit physicians. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the ALJ misapplied 
Niagara Frontier either because its balancing test should not 
have been invoked or because the balance was struck 
inappropriately. The District argues in response that the ALJ's 
decision is correct on the facts and law and should be affirmed. 
-
7The contract between the County Home and ECMC may not be one 
properly characterized as a subcontract because both the Home and 
ECMC are departments of the county. The services in dispute, 
however, are rendered by physicians of UMS, a separate corporate 
entity, under UMS' agreement with ECMC. Although the exact 
status of the UMS physicians is unclear, the parties stipulated 
that they are nonunit employees in their capacity as UMS service 
providers to the County. Whether directly or indirectly, by 
subcontract or otherwise, the County has transferred work from 
CSEA's unit to nonunit personnel, and we have analyzed the case 
accordingly. 
^18 PERB ?[3083 (1985) .. 
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Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALT's decision. 
The Home is a long-term nursing care facility. Of its 
approximately 64 0 residents, 8 0% are over the age of 65. The 
other residents suffer from a variety of medical illnesses such 
as multiple sclerosis or from trauma-related conditions. 
Before subcontracting the medical care, the County treated 
the Home's elderly and infirm residents through full-time and 
regular part-time staff physicians. These unit physicians were 
assigned a specific group of patients and they were present, for 
at least a few hours, each weekday. Weekends were covered by one 
of the regular part-time physicians. The staff physicians did 
not have certification in any specialty and they did not have 
admitting privileges at ECMC, where the Home's residents receive 
medical care either on an in-patient or out-patient basis as 
necessary. 
Commencing January 1, 1995, medical care for the Home's 
residents has been provided by UMS with physicians from an acute 
geriatrics medical services group. Four of the five physicians 
in this group who provide services to the County are certified 
gerontdlogists who have admitting privileges at ECMC; the fifth 
physician is an internist who treats patients at the Home, but 
not at ECMC= Each of the physicians is permanently assigned 
specific patients at the Home. One physician is scheduled to be 
at the Home each weekday; the others are always on call. A full-
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time nurse practitioner is provided at the Home forty hours per 
week on a two-week rotation from ECMC. 
In subcontracting for medical services, the County decided 
that care for the Home's residents would be or might be improved 
under a medical delivery system which used a group of physicians 
and allied professionals with specialized training and which 
helped to ensure, through the physicians7 admitting privileges at 
ECMC, continuity of care for patients both in residence and, when 
necessary, at ECMC.-7 Having concluded that the County changed 
qualifications with respect to medical specialty and hospital 
admitting privileges by its decision to subcontract, the ALJ 
properly reached the balancing of interests under Niagara 
Frontier, and we agree that the AKJ reached the correct balance 
in this case. 
Health care for the elderly and infirm, as the ALJ correctly 
recognized, is central to the County's mission. It is at least 
as much mission-related as the concern articulated by the 
employer in West Hempstead Union Free School District-7 for 
student safety and protection of property, which exempted the 
employer from a duty to negotiate the decision to substitute 
teachers for teacher aides to provide cafeteria supervision, 
notwithstanding that the teacher aides thereby lost their jobs. 
-
7Patients from the Home are treated by their assigned physician 
when hospitalized approximately 60% of the time, and the balance 
of hospital cases are treated by another member of the geriatric 
services group. 
-
714 PERB 5[3096 (1981) . 
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In this case, in addition to a significant change in the 
qualifications required of the treating physicians (i.e., from 
nonspecialty to medical Board-certified gerontology specialty), 
the County has restructured its medical delivery system between 
Home and hospital by contracting for services to be rendered by 
physicians possessing admitting privileges at ECMC, where the 
Home's residents are treated, privileges which the unit 
physicians did not have. 
In assessing the negotiability of the County's decision, the 
issue is not whether the care provided to the Home's residents is 
in fact better than before the subcontract, as the County 
alleges, or whether it is unchanged or worse than before, as CSEA 
alleges.-7 Under this proposed analysis, we would be required 
to decide whether the Home's health care was in fact improved 
under the subcontract and find the County in violation of the Act 
if it was not. The Board has never undertaken such a role in 
deciding whether an employer has violated its duty to negotiate 
with respect to any subject. The very reason certain decisions 
embrace managerial prerogatives is because those decisions are 
for management to make whether or not they are ultimately proven 
to have been correct or wise. Our inquiry is only as to whether 
-
7The record shows that, after contracting with UMS, hospital 
admissions of the Home's residents decreased as did the number of 
visits to ECMC for out-patient clinical services and the length 
of stay in hospital. Although not disputing the statistics, CSEA 
argues that they do not necessarily evidence an improved quality 
of care, rather medical conditions which might be going 
unobserved. 
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the County's action constitutes the exercise of a managerial 
right. 
Here, the County exercised its prerogative to determine the 
qualifications of the physicians treating its elderly and infirm 
by requiring a medical specialty of them. It exercised its right 
to determine the type and level of medical service it would offer 
by requiring that treating physicians at the Home have admitting 
privileges at ECMC for the purpose of providing the Home's 
residents a large measure of continuous care previously lacking. 
Having made those determinations, the balance of competing 
interests must weigh in the County's favor in the circumstances 
of this case, notwithstanding the loss of unit positions and 
employees. The ALJ's credibility determination that the economic 
savings generated by the elimination of unit positions and staff 
were only a secondary factor in the County's decision to 
subcontract lends further support to what is already a compelling 
argument favoring a balance of interest in the County's favor. 
For the reasons set forth above, CSEA's exceptions are 
denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 31, 1996 
Albany, New York 
4, 
Pauline R.' Kihsell'a, Chairperson 
Eric 3/C Schmertz, Member^ 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions and cross-exceptions 
filed, respectively, by the Newburgh Firefighters Association, 
Local 589, IAFF (Association), the City of Newburgh (City) and 
the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA), to a decision by an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ)• The Association's charge, as amended, alleges that 
the City violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees7 Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally transferred fire 
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dispatching duties previously performed by the fire fighters in 
the Association's unit to civilians who are in CSEA's unit. 
After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed the Association's charge. The 
ALJ held that the unit work was fire dispatching, not dispatching 
of emergency services generally, and that the Association had 
exclusivity over that work. Relying upon our decision in State 
of New York (DOCS) ,-7 and our three "civilianization" cases,-7 
the ALJ also concluded that the substitution of fire dispatchers 
in CSEA's unit for the fire fighters in the Association's unit 
represented a per se change in job qualifications, triggering the 
balancing of interests under our decision in Niagara Frontier 
Transportation Authority.-7 Finding that the City's interests 
in redeploying the fire fighters to. professional fire-fighting 
duties clearly outweighed the interests of the Association and 
the fire fighters, the ALJ held that the City had not violated 
the Act by using CSEA's fire dispatchers for fire dispatching. 
The Association argues in its exceptions that the ALJ 
misapplied the several decisions previously referenced. It 
argues that our decisions require an employer which has 
civilianized its uniformed services to plead and prove that it 
affirmatively determined certain qualifications were not needed 
-
727 PERB 53055 (1994), aff'd.- A=D.2d , 29 PERB 57008 (3d 
Dep't 1996) . * ' • ' ' ' 
^
7Citv of New Rochelle, 13 PERB 53045 (1980); City of Albany, 
13 PERB 53011 (1980) ; County of Suffolk, 12 PERB 53123 (1979) . 
^
718 PERB 53083 (1985) . 
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to perform the work which it transferred and that the transfer of 
that work was based primarily, or at least in part, upon that 
determination. It argues also that the ALT erred in holding that 
a change in job qualifications is, per se, a change in services. 
According to the Association, our existing precedent requires an 
employer to prove factually a change in the services offered with 
respect to the work which has been transferred from the charging 
party's negotiating unit. In this case, the Association argues 
that fire dispatching duties were not changed at all in 
conjunction with the transfer of those duties to fire dispatchers 
in CSEA's unit. The Association also disputes the ALJ's finding 
that the detrimental effects of the transfer upon it and its unit 
employees were de minimis. 
- In its cross-exceptions, the City argues that the ALJ erred 
in concluding that the unit work is fire dispatching and that the 
Association has exclusivity over that work. The City also argues 
that the ALJ erred in ruling that the Association's unit 
composition and its membership policies are irrelevant to any 
required balancing of interests, in failing to find that the 
Association's agreement to a management rights clause waived any 
further right it had to negotiate transfers of work from its 
unit, and in not accepting evidence regarding police dispatching 
and certain of the benefits it allegedly derived from the 
transfer of fire dispatching to the fire dispatchers in CSEA's 
unit. 
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In its cross-exceptions, CSEA, like the City, argues that 
the Association's refusal to admit civilian employees to 
membership in its unit disqualifies it from representing civilian 
dispatchers. 
Both the City and CSEA argue in the responses they filed to 
the Association's exceptions that the ALT correctly applied 
existing precedent and that the Association's charge was properly 
dismissed. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the AKT's 
dismissal of the charge, but we do so primarily on the ground 
that the Association did not on the facts of this case have 
exclusivity over fire dispatching. 
For many years, CSEA and the City have been parties to 
collective bargaining agreements in which CSEA is specifically 
recognized as the bargaining agent for the title of fire 
dispatcher. The Association does not represent the title of fire 
dispatcher. The fire fighters' job description does not 
reference dispatching duties. The qualifications for a fire 
fighter are admittedly much higher than those for a fire 
dispatcher. 
From the early 1960s until the"mid to later 1970s, fire 
dispatching in the City was done by fire dispatchers in CSEA's 
unit and by disabled fire fighters who were assigned dispatching 
as light duty under §209-a of the General Municipal Law. The 
City stopped employing fire dispatchers some time during the term 
of the CSEA-City contract covering 1973 through 1976. 
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Thereafter, the City assigned all fire dispatching duties to fire 
fighters in the Association's unit, apparently without objection 
from CSEA or the Association. The City did not, however, abolish 
the fire dispatcher position and CSEA and the City always 
retained that title within CSEA's unit. The City did not again 
employ a person in the title of fire dispatcher until January 
1994, when it hired four employees into that title. It was that 
event which led to this charge being filed. 
Although only fire fighters have done fire dispatching for 
approximately eighteen years, we do not consider the Association 
to have acquired exclusivity over all fire dispatching under all 
circumstances due to the special circumstances present in this 
case. CSEA unit dispatchers had always done fire dispatching 
whenever there was an incumbent in the title of fire dispatcher. 
In that circumstance, fire fighters were only assigned the work 
as light duty, not as a part of their regular assignments. To 
find the City in violation of the Act by hiring fire dispatchers 
to fill an existing unit position and giving them the work of 
that position would mean that the unit title which CSEA and the 
City have maintained within CSEA's unit for many years would be 
effectively removed from CSEA's unit. CSEA would retain a paper 
claim to the position, but the City could not realistically hire 
anyone into that position because it could not assign any 
dispatching work to the incumbents of that position without 
risking the very type of charge the Association has filed against 
it. 
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When the City again employed persons in the title of fire • 
dispatcher, dispatching once again became work which could be 
assigned to the employees in CSEA's unit without violating the 
Association's bargaining rights. The Association simply never 
has had exclusivity over fire dispatching when, there has been a 
civilian dispatcher employed. Therefore, by again hiring fire 
dispatchers and assigning them the work required of that 
position, the City did not violate any bargaining duty owed to 
the Association.-7 
For the reasons set forth above, we grant the City's cross-
exception to the extent it claims that the ALT erred by holding 
that the Association had exclusivity over all fire dispatching. 
Our dismissal of the charge on this ground makes it unnecessary 
to consider any of the parties' other arguments, exceptions or 
cross-exceptions. We note, however, that our decision this date 
in Fairview Fire District,-7 which we incorporate herein by 
reference, is dispositive of the Association's other exceptions and 
would itself require affirmance of the ALJ's decision in this case. 
-
7We are not called upon and do not decide whether CSEA has 
exclusivity over all fire dispatching so long as the City employs 
a civilian dispatcher. Whether the City's assignment of a fire 
fighter to dispatch duty would violate CSEA's bargaining rights 
is simply not before us. Similarly, we do not decide whether the 
Association could object to an assignment of fire dispatching to 
persons other than fire fighters under any circumstances 
different from those presented here. 
^
729 PERB ?[3042 (1996) . 
Board - U-15449 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 31, 199 6 
Albany, New York 
fa^t 
Pauline R. Kinsella, C 
^ 
hairperson 
Eric J< Schmertz, Member 
/ 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions and cross-exceptions 
filed, respectively, by the Onondaga County Sheriffs Police 
Association (Association) and the County of Onondaga and the 
Sheriff of the County of Onondaga (County) to a decision of the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) dismissing the Association's charge that the County 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when work from the Association's unit was assigned to an 
employee in a different' unit represented by the Deputy Sheriffs 
Benevolent Association (DSBA). 
The parties submitted the matter to the Director for 
decision on a stipulated record. Pursuant to that stipulation 
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the Director found that until April 1, 1994, all Sheriff's 
Department employees, including those in the police division and 
the custody division, were represented in one unit by the DSBA. 
On April 1, 1994, the Association became the exclusive bargaining 
agent for a unit consisting of only the employees of the police 
division.-7 The DSBA continued as the representative of the 
employees in the custody division.-1 At all times thereafter, 
the 1992-95 collective bargaining agreement as negotiated by the 
DSBA and the County remained in effect and was made applicable to 
both units. That agreement contains the following management 
rights clause: 
Article IV 
County Management 
The Association agrees that the County, of Onondaga 
and/or the County Legislature and the Sheriff, 
hereinafter known as the Employer, shall retain 
complete authority for the policies and administration 
of all County departments, offices or agencies which it 
exercises under the provisions of law and the 
Constitution of the State of New York and/or the United 
States of America and in fulfilling its rights and 
responsibilities under this agreement. Any matter 
involving the management of governmental operations 
vested by law in the Sheriff and not covered by this 
agreement is in the province of the Sheriff. 
-''Those titles include deputy sheriff patrol, deputy sheriff 
sergeant and deputy sheriff lieutenant. 
-
xThe titles represented by DSBA include, as here relevant, 
deputy sheriff jail, deputy sheriff sergeant jail and deputy 
sheriff lieutenant jail. 
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The rights and responsibilities of the employer 
include, but are not necessarily limited to the 
following: (1) to determine the standards of service 
to be offered by its offices, agencies and departments; 
(2) to direct, hire, promote, appraise, transfer, 
assign, retain employees and to suspend, demote, 
discharge or take disciplinary action against 
employees; (3) to relieve employees from duties because 
of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons; (4) to 
maintain the efficiency of government operations 
entrusted to them; (5) to determine the methods, means 
and personnel by which such operations are to be 
conducted; (6) to take whatever actions may be 
necessary to carry out the mission, policies or purpose 
of the department, office or agency concerned; (7) to 
establish any reasonable rules or regulations; (8) to 
establish specifications for each class of positions 
and to classify or reclassify and to allocate or 
reallocate new or existing positions. 
The Association further agrees that the provisions of 
this Article are not subject to grievance procedures as 
set forth herein unless in the exercise of said rights 
and responsibilities the employer has violated a 
specific term or regulations of this agreement, 
(emphasis added) 
The County had always assigned certain duties characterized 
as the duties of the "Fleet Manager" to a member of the overall 
unit.-7 At the time the Association became the bargaining agent 
for the employees in the police division the Fleet Manager duties 
were performed by a deputy sheriff in the police division. That 
individual continued to perform the duties until March 13, 1995, 
when the duties were reassigned by the Sheriff to a deputy 
sheriff jail, a title in the remainder of the former unit which 
continued to be represented by DSBA. 
-'Fleet Manager is not a job title in either the original unit or 
in the two units created therefrom. 
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The Director held that the Association had established 
exclusivity over the Fleet Manager duties.-7 However, he 
dismissed the charge upon finding a waiver of any right of the 
Association to negotiate transfers of work to any personnel 
within the Sheriff's department in either its unit or DSBA's 
unit, based on the language of the management rights clause in 
Article IV of the 1992-95 agreement. 
The Association excepts to the Director's finding of a 
waiver. The County supports the Director's dismissal of the 
charge and his finding of waiver, but cross-excepts to the 
Director's finding that the Fleet Manager duties were exclusive 
to the Association's unit and his failure to find that the 
Sheriff could assign work not only to any personnel in the 
Sheriff's Department, but also to any other County employees or 
to the employees of a private contractor. 
Based on our review of the record and after consideration of 
the parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
-''The stipulation is not clear on this point. It provides that 
the Fleet Manager duties were performed by a deputy in the police 
division prior to the appointment of a deputy sheriff jail on 
March 13, 1995. It also provides that prior to the fragmentation 
of the overall unit represented by DSBA, the Fleet Manager duties 
had been performed by members of that unit. The Association 
argues, and the Director so held, that the deputies in the police 
division had historically performed the Fleet Manager duties, 
even when they were in the former unit represented by DSBA. The 
County argues that since the duties were performed by any member 
of the former unit, the fact that a deputy sheriff in the police 
division was performing the duties at the time of the 
fragmentation and continued to perform those duties for some 
months thereafter does not establish exclusivity. Because of our 
ultimate finding, we need not reach this issue. 
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It is clear from the language of Article IV (5) that the 
County has, at least, reserved the right to assign duties 
performed by employees in the job titles in the overall unit to 
any of the job titles that were in the unit at the time the 
management rights clause was negotiated. Indeed, the Association 
concedes that the contract language would have enabled the County 
to assign to any member of the former, overall, unit the Fleet 
Manager duties if that unit had continued unchanged. The split 
of that unit, however, is immaterial to the nature and extent of 
the County's retained management rights. These rights did not 
change when the unit was divided. To the contrary, the contract 
was specifically carried over unchanged and made applicable to 
both units. 
Our decision finding that the County did not violate the Act 
by assigning the Fleet Manager duties to a deputy sheriff jail 
makes it unnecessary to reach the cross-exceptions. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Association's exceptions are 
denied and the decision of the Director is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 31, 1996 
Albany, New York 
P a u l 
4. i <-v \/ i\ 
f t U 4 i ~ J ^ 1\^<AA\_L 
ulin^-vRJ Kinsella, Chairperson 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the East 
Hampton Police Benevolent Association (PBA) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge that the 
Town of East Hampton (Town) violated §209-a.l(c), (d) and (e) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally transferred exclusive bargaining unit work-7 to 
-''As amended, PBA's charge alleges that the Town transferred the 
issuance of summonses and tickets in the beach parking area, 
patrolling the Town beaches and responding to both vehicle and 
traffic and domestic violence incidents. 
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harbor masters and bay constables, who are represented by the 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, Local 852, East Hampton Town Unit (CSEA). 
The ALT held that the in-issue work had not been exclusively 
performed by employees represented by the PBA. The PBA excepts 
to the ALJ's decision, arguing that it is not supported by the 
record. Both the Town and CSEA support the ALJ's decision. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties7 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
The PBA is the exclusive bargaining agent for a unit of all 
police officers, detectives, sergeants, detective, sergeants, 
lieutenants, radio dispatchers and captains employed by the Town. 
The police officers have many duties, including patrolling the 
Town, issuing tickets and summonses and responding to calls for 
assistance in vehicle and traffic and domestic violence 
incidents. 
The ALJ found that, prior to 1989, the Town maintained a 
marine division as part of its Police Department.-7 The marine 
division was abolished in 1989, and a new Department of Harbors 
and Docks was created and the harbor masters and bay constables 
were placed within that department. The harbor masters were 
-''The PBA excepts to the ALJ's finding that the marine division 
was abolished pursuant to a compulsory interest arbitration 
award. That division was abolished while the PBA and the Town 
were engaged in contract negotiations. Reference to the division 
was thereafter removed from the PBA-Town contract by virtue of 
the arbitration award. The means by which the abolition was 
effected is not material to the decision in this case. 
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responsible for the orderly flow of harbor traffic and bay 
constables patrolled the Town's waterways, enforcing federal/ 
state and local regulations governing game fish and shellfish. 
Crediting the testimony of William Taylor, a senior harbor 
master, and Todd Sarris, a captain in the Police Department,-'' 
the AKJ found that since 1989, the patrolling of Town beaches, 
which had always been a job duty of the bay constables, was also 
assigned to the harbor masters. .Beach patrol also includes the 
duties of ensuring that vehicles which are operating on the beach 
are doing so properly, enforcing all ordinances relating to the 
beaches, and issuing tickets for violations. 
The AKJ also found that, between Memorial Day and Labor Day, 
the Town employs Traffic Control Officers (TCOs) who are 
responsible,.as here relevant, for issuing summonses in beach 
parking areas. These employees are characterized as seasonal 
employees and are unrepresented. Since 1989, the Town has also 
employed both part-time and seasonal police officers who have 
issued summonses in beach parking areas. 
Finally, the ALJ found that there was no evidence that the 
Town ever dispatched the harbor masters or bay constables to 
-''There is nothing in the record to support the PBA's assertion 
that the ALJ erred in crediting the testimony of these two 
witnesses, which is largely unrebutted. 
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respond to vehicle and traffic incidents or domestic violence 
incidents.-7 
As we made clear in Niagara Frontier Transportation 
Authority-7, there is a duty to negotiate a transfer of work if 
that work has been performed exclusively by employees in the 
charging party's bargaining unit, the tasks as reassigned are 
substantially similar to those performed by unit employees before 
the transfer and there has not been a significant change in 
qualifications. Here, the record makes clear that beach patrol 
and the issuance of summonses and tickets in beach parking areas 
is not and has not been the exclusive work of employees in the 
PBA's unit. TCOs, bay constables and harbor masters-7 have 
performed these duties in an open and ongoing manner since at 
least 1991 and, in some instances, since 1989. The PBA's 
-'On one occasion, a harbor master pursued a vehicle off the 
beach to issue a ticket and on another occasion, the senior 
harbor master responded to a police officer's call for assistance 
in a domestic violence incident when he became aware that no 
other back-up was available. 
^18 PERB H3083 (1985). 
-
7While the PBA alleges in its exceptions that the part-time 
police officers, who also performed some of the duties in issue, 
are unit employees, no evidence was introduced by the PBA in 
support of this claim. Further, the ALJ did not reach the 
question of their unit inclusion because he found that TCOs, bay 
constables and harbor masters had issued tickets and summonses in 
beach parking areas for some time prior to the filing of the 
charge and that this was sufficient to deny the PBA exclusivity 
over the work in issue. We, therefore, do not address the 
inclusion of the part-time and seasonal police officers in the 
PBA's unit. 
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assertion that it was unaware of some of these assignments does 
not warrant a contrary conclusion. As we have previously held: 
To hold that a union's ignorance of an employer's open 
assignment of nonunit personnel to work also done by 
unit personnel establishes or maintains the union's 
exclusivity over the work would be inconsistent with 
the approach we have taken in cases involving the 
transfer of unit work.-7 
The allegation that the Town had improperly reassigned 
response to vehicle and traffic incidents and domestic violence 
incidents to the harbor masters and bay constables was dismissed 
by the ALJ because there was no evidence in support of the 
allegation that such reassignments have taken place. In 
affirming that finding, we do not decide whether such 
reassignments, if made, would violate the Act. 
Based on the foregoing, the PBA's exceptions are denied and 
the decision of the ALJ is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 31,.1996 
Albany, New York 
Pau'line'R. Kihsella, Chai rperson 
Eric J^ Schmertz, Member 
/ 
Z/State of New York (Div. of Military and Naval Affairs), 2 7 PERB 
H3027, at 3067-68 (1994). 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, INC., 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15718 
TOWN OF LLOYD, 
Respondent. 
THOMAS P. HALLEY, ESQ., for charging Party 
DI STASI and MORIELLO, P.C. (LEWIS C. DI STASI and SEAN 
MURPHY of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the United 
Federation of Police Officers, Inc. (Federation) to a decision of 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge that the 
Town of Lloyd (Town) violated §209-a.l(d) and (e) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
transferred the investigation of serious motor vehicle and/or 
industrial accidents from Town police officers represented by the 
Federation to the New York State Police (State Police). 
The ALJ determined that the investigation of such cases had 
never been the exclusive work of employees of the Town of Lloyd 
Police Department and he, therefore, dismissed the charge. The 
Federation excepts to the ALJ's factual and legal conclusions. 
The Town supports the ALJ's decision. 
Board - U-15718 -2 
After reviewing the record and considering the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
On May 25, 1994, the Town Chief of Police issued a 
memorandum to all police officers and dispatchers directing that 
all accidents involving either an immediate or potential fatality 
be turned over to the State Police. Town police were further 
directed to provide assistance and support to the State Police. 
The instant charge followed after the Town failed to respond to 
the Federation's demand to rescind the memorandum and negotiate 
any transfer of bargaining unit work. 
The ALJ found, based upon the uncontroverted testimony 
offered by both the Federation and the Town17, that for at least 
twenty-five years, Town police officers, Ulster County deputy 
sheriffs and members of the State Police have responded to 
accident or crime scenes interchangeably, depending on which 
agency was called or happened upon the scene.-7 Even when the 
Town police officers were first on the scene of an accident or 
crime, the Town frequently requested the State Police to take 
over the investigation. The Town's practice was to have the 
police officer on the scene call a supervisor who would notify 
the officer in charge. That officer would then determine, based 
-
/r£he Federation called as its only witness George Rebhan, the 
Chief of Police since January 1, 1994. The Town's only witness 
was Gary Gaetano, who, as a lieutenant, was the officer in charge 
from January 1992 to June 1993. 
-'The Town instituted a 911 system, which directs calls to any 
of these three police agencies, at some time before the Chief's 
May 25 memorandum. 
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on staffing, resources and the seriousness of the incident, 
whether to hand the matter over to the State Police. 
An employer violates the Act when it unilaterally transfers 
work which has been performed exclusively by bargaining unit 
members, where the tasks reassigned are substantially similar to 
those performed by the unit and there has been no change in 
qualifications.-7 The record in this case makes clear that 
response to and further handling of accidents within the Town was 
never the exclusive work of the police officers represented by 
the Federation, but rather was determined initially by which 
officers - police officers, deputy sheriffs or members of the 
State Police - arrived at the scene first. Even when the Town's 
police officers were the first to respond, a determination was 
then made by the Town as to whether the State Police would be 
called in to handle the case. 
The Federation argues in its exceptions that a discernible 
boundary may be drawn around the exercise of discretion by the 
police department to determine whether a case would be turned 
over to the State Police and that the Chief's memo unilaterally 
removed that discretion from police officers and their 
supervisors.-7 The record, however, supports the AKJ's 
determination that the decision to assign a case to other than 
the Town's police officers was made by the officer in charge or 
^Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth. , 18 PERB «R3083 (1985) . 
^See City of Rochester, 21 PERB [^3040 (1988), conf'd, 155 A.D.2d 
1003, 22 PERB [^7035 (4th Dep't 1989). 
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the Chief of Police. To the extent that any discretion to turn 
cases over to the State Police rested in the Town's police 
department, that discretion was usually exercised by the 
management of the department, certainly not exclusively by unit 
members. Accordingly, the ALJ correctly found that the work of 
investigating fatal or potentially fatal accidents was not 
exclusively unit work, and that the decisions concerning such 
jurisdiction were not exclusively within the control of the 
unit.^7 
Based upon the foregoing, the Federation's exceptions are 
denied and the decision of the ALJ is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 31, 1996 
Albany, New York 
Pa'uline R.yKirisella, Chairperson 
Eric J/T Schmertz, Member 
-'Cf. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of Long 
Beach, 26 PERB 53065 (1993). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND 
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, NEW YORK COUNCIL 66 
and its affiliated AFSCME LOCAL 1095, ERIE 
COUNTY BLUE COLLAR EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15902 
COUNTY OF ERIE, 
Respondent. 
JOEL POCH, ESQ., for Charging Party 
MICHAEL A. CONNERS, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, New York 
Council 66 and its affiliated AFSCME Local 1095, Erie County Blue 
Collar Employees Union (AFSCME) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge alleging 
that the County of Erie (County) violated §209-a.l(a), (d) and 
(e) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally subcontracted cable pulling,-7 which was exclusive 
bargaining unit work. 
-''Cable pulling is the process of running cable through conduits 
in the floors of County buildings, without installing the cable 
at either end. The conduits are designed to hold cable, 
electrical wire, or telephone lines, separately or together. 
Board - U-15902 -2 
The ALJ found that, in August 1994, the County contracted 
with GTE to install, pull and connect cables in two County 
buildings in downtown Buffalo as part of the County's program for 
replacement of its computer systems, the largest such project 
undertaken by the County in twenty-five years. In January 1995, 
the County contracted with FASPAK, another private contractor, to 
perform similar work. AFSCME represents County employees in the 
titles of telephone technician, building maintenance mechanic -
electrician, and assistant supervisor maintenance mechanic -
electrician who have, in the past, pulled cable used for voice 
and data operations within the County buildings. The ALJ 
determined that the work in issue was not exclusive to the unit 
represented by AFSCME, finding that pulling of cable for voice 
and data transmission had previously been performed by both non-
unit employees of the County and by private contractors. As 
AFSCME had failed to establish exclusivity over the work in-
issue, the ALJ dismissed the charge. 
AFSCME argues in its exceptions that the ALJ's decision 
rests erroneously on a theory of implied waiver of exclusivity 
and that the ALJ erred both in determining the boundaries of the 
unit work and in his analysis of the facts of the case. The 
County supports the ALJ's decision. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
AFSCME's case hinges on distinguishing the cable pulling done 
by unit employees from that done by nonunit employees and private 
^ Board - U-15902 -3 
contractors. While AFSCME alleged that pulling Level 3 cable for 
hookup to computers was exclusive bargaining unit work,-7 the 
record clearly establishes, and the ALJ so found, that other 
County employees and private contractors have regularly pulled 
Level 3 cable in County facilities, for both voice and data 
transmission. AFSCME sought to establish a discernible boundary 
exclusively encompassing bargaining unit work by asserting that 
unit employees have exclusively pulled Level 3 cable for computer 
hookup.-7 The ALJ.found that no discernible boundary could be 
drawn around the pulling of Level 3 cable for computers and the 
pulling of Level 3 cable for other purposes. As the record 
clearly establishes, the point of hookup has no impact at all on 
J the cable-pulling operation. Indeed, AFSCME witnesses testified 
that they simply run the cable through conduits from one point to 
another. They play no role in the hookup of the cable, whether 
to computers, telephones or other devices. Level 3 cable has 
been pulled by nonunit employees arid outside contractors on 
numerous occasions and for a variety of purposes, including 
computer hookup. Therefore, no discernible boundary can be drawn 
-
7Level 3 is the standard that defines cable performance to 
support network, data and voice applications. 
-
7AFSCME concurred with the ALJ's description of the charge at 
the hearing as alleging only "that pulling cable three wire for 
the purpose of connection to computers was exclusive bargaining 
unit work". 
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around the pulling of cable for computer hookup.-7 The work 
performed by unit employees is the same as work performed by 
other, nonunit County employees and outside contractors. AFSCME 
has failed to establish the exclusivity necessary to determine 
that the County's use of outside contractors violated the Act. 
AFSCME further asserts that it did not waive exclusivity 
because it was unaware of some of the instances in the past when 
the County utilized nonunit employees or private contractors to 
pull cable. The issue in this context is not a waiver of 
exclusivity but rather whether AFSCME had exclusivity in fact 
over the work at the time of the alleged transfer. As we noted 
in State of New York (Division of Military and Naval Affairs)-7, 
To hold that a union's ignorance of an employer's open 
assignment of nonunit personnel to work also done by 
unit personnel establishes or maintains the union's 
exclusivity over that work would be inconsistent with 
the approach we have taken in cases involving the 
transfer of unit work. It would test exclusivity over 
unit work only by the extent of the union's knowledge 
of assignments, forcing repeated.inquiries into and 
determinations about the reasonableness of the union's 
ignorance. An employer's utilization of nonunit 
personnel in fact would be irrelevant, except as it 
bore upon the reasonableness of the union's asserted 
unawareness of that utilization. This would 
effectively remove from the union any burden to 
establish exclusivity in fact over the work and shift 
to an employer a burden to rebut the union's claim that 
it did not know and could not have known that nonunit 
^See Union-Endicott Cent. Sch. Dist. , 26 PERB 53075 (1993) where 
we rejected a definition of unit work similar to the definition 
urged by AFSCME in this case. . 
5/ 27 PERB 53027, at 3067-68 (1994) 
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personnel were being used to do work over which the 
union claims exclusivity. Were we to focus on a 
union's knowledge of employee utilization to establish 
exclusivity, we would effectively alter the respective 
burdens of proof in transfer of work cases and, 
thereby, distort the balance of competing rights and 
interests we struck in Niagara Frontier Transportation 
Authority. [18 PERB [^3083 (1985)] We believe that the 
standards we established in Niagara Frontier 
Transportation Authority reasonably protect the rights 
and interests of unions and employers alike and promote 
the purposes and policies of the Act. 
AFSCME concedes that it was aware of at least some of the 
instances in which the County openly utilized nonunit employees 
or private contractors to pull cable. With that concession, 
AFSCME does not have exclusivity in fact over the at-issue work. 
Lacking exclusivity, AFSCME cannot prevail in its charge that the 
County violated the Act when it assigned pulling of Level 3 cable 
to outside contractors. 
Based on the foregoing, the exceptions are denied and the 
decision of the ALJ is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 31, 199 6 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric/f. Schmertz, Member/ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 10 00, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4418 
VILLAGE OF ATLANTIC BEACH, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time workers of the 
•Department of Public Works. 
Excluded: The Superintendent of Public Works and all 
other employees. 
Certification - C-4418 
- 2 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: July 31, 1996 
Albany, New York 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF EAST FISHKILL POLICE 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4536 
TOWN OF EAST FISHKILL, 
Employer, 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE FEDERATION OF POLICE, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the • 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Town of East Fishkill Police 
Benevolent Association, Inc. has been designated and selected by 
a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, 
in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
Certification - C-4536 - 2 -
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time police officers, 
including patrolmen, detective, sergeant, 
lieutenant and detective lieutenant. 
Excluded: Chief of Police. 
FURTHER, IT IS - ORDERED-that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Town of East Fishkill 
Police Benevolent Association, Inc. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: July 31, 1996 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION/NEW YORK, 
Case Nos. C-4547 
and C-4563 
Petitioner, 
-and-
CHAUTAUQUA LAKE CENTRAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the National Education 
Association/New York has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-4547 & C-4563 - 2 • 
Unit: Included All full-time and part-time employees in the 
following job titles: bus driver, monitor, 
utility worker, typist, custodian,cook, food 
service helper, mechanic, mechanic helper, 
cleaner, clerk, school secretary, and office aide 
Excluded: Teacher assistant, claims adjuster, district 
clerk, district treasurer, business executive 1, 
business executive secretarial assistant, head 
custodian, head bus driver, cook manager, 
superintendent of buildings & grounds, school 
nurse, secretary to the Superintendent, public 
relations specialist, and all other titles 
employed by the District. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the National Education 
Association/New York. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: July 31, 1996 
Albany, New York 
Paulane R. Kinsella1, Chairperson 
